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The Tragedy of Leadership Power: What Mearsheimer's Realism Reveals About Competition

JW
Jason Williamson
September 30, 2025
13 min read
#leadership#strategy#competition#power-dynamics#organizational-theory

The most cooperative CEOs build the strongest defenses. The most purpose-driven companies accumulate the most market power. The firms that speak most eloquently about stakeholder capitalism invest most aggressively in competitive moats.

This isn't hypocrisy. It's structural reality.

Leaders today face a maddening tension. They genuinely want to build collaborative ecosystems. They articulate visions of shared value and mutual benefit with authentic conviction. Yet these same leaders find themselves executing strategies of dominance, accumulating capabilities that threaten competitors, and measuring success through relative advantage rather than absolute gains.

Why does this pattern repeat across industries and geographies? Why do even well-intentioned leaders become power maximizers?

The answer lies not in business strategy but in international relations theory. John J. Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism explains why great powers cannot escape the pursuit of dominance, regardless of their stated values or authentic preferences. His framework reveals how structural conditions transform cautious actors into aggressive competitors. The insight is uncomfortable but essential. In systems without guarantees, power accumulation begins as insurance and evolves into strategy.

The Architecture of Competition

Most discussions of realism fixate on "anarchy" and miss the deeper machinery. Anarchy in international relations simply means no supreme authority exists to enforce agreements or provide protection. But this condition alone doesn't cause conflict.

Competition emerges from the interaction of five structural elements that create what Mearsheimer calls "the tragedy of great power politics."

First, anarchy creates a self-help imperative. Without a protective authority, survival depends entirely on one's own capabilities. States must provide their own security. Companies must ensure their own survival. No external force will save you if you fall behind.

Second, every actor possesses offensive capabilities. All states maintain some capacity to harm others through military, economic, or cyber means. Similarly, every company can potentially disrupt, acquire, or destroy competitors. These capabilities exist regardless of current intentions.

Third, intentions remain perpetually uncertain. You cannot know with certainty what competitors intend today, much less tomorrow. Leadership changes. Strategies shift. Yesterday's partner becomes today's rival. Britain and Germany traded extensively in 1913. By 1914, they were at war. Corporate history offers similar reversals.

Fourth, survival represents the primary goal. States may pursue prosperity, ideology, or glory, but none of these matter without survival. Companies may champion various missions, but bankruptcy ends all missions. This hierarchy means security concerns override other considerations when threats escalate.

Fifth, actors think strategically about survival. States and companies don't just react to immediate threats. They anticipate future challenges, hedge against uncertainty, and position themselves for long-term advantage. This forward-looking rationality transforms present stability into future competition.

The interaction of these five forces creates competitive dynamics that individual actors cannot escape through good intentions alone.

Consider how this works. Because you operate in anarchy (no protective authority), and because others possess offensive capabilities (they could harm you), and because you cannot know their intentions (opacity), and because you must survive (primary goal), and because you think strategically (anticipation), you must accumulate power as insurance against future threats.

But here's where the logic becomes tragic. Your accumulation of defensive capabilities appears threatening to others. They cannot know your intentions are defensive. They see your growing power and must respond by building their own capabilities. Their response validates your initial fears, justifying further accumulation.

This is the security dilemma that Robert Jervis identified as central to international politics. Each actor's rational pursuit of security creates insecurity for others, generating a spiral of competition that no one initially desired but everyone eventually perpetuates.

The tragedy deepens because this dynamic operates regardless of leaders' personal preferences. A pacifist president still faces the structural reality that other states possess offensive capabilities. A collaborative CEO still confronts competitors who might exploit cooperation. Good intentions cannot change the structural logic.

Gorbachev discovered this when attempting to transform Soviet foreign policy. His "new thinking" emphasized cooperation and mutual security. These weren't propaganda. Gorbachev genuinely believed competitive dynamics could be transcended through changed attitudes. Yet structural pressures from U.S. military capabilities and NATO expansion ultimately overwhelmed his cooperative intentions. The system's logic proved stronger than individual agency.

The business parallel is instructive. When Reed Hastings built Netflix's culture around radical transparency and talent density, he genuinely believed in collaborative industry relationships. Netflix shared its culture deck publicly, hoping others would adopt similar practices. But as Netflix accumulated streaming power, partners became competitors. Content providers who once licensed happily began withholding catalogs and launching rival services. Hastings' cooperative intentions collided with structural reality. Netflix had to become what it never set out to be: a content production company competing directly with the studios it once partnered with.

Mearsheimer's most disturbing insight concerns the impossibility of achieving "enough" power for security. In a self-help system with uncertain intentions, no amount of power guarantees safety. This drives what he calls offensive realism. The pursuit of hegemony stems not from greed but from the structural impossibility of achieving security through limited power.

How much military capability does China need to feel secure from the United States? How much does America need to deter China? There is no objective answer. What feels like minimum security to one appears as maximum threat to another. This indeterminacy pushes both toward maximization.

The corporate equivalent drives companies toward monopoly or at least dominant market position. This isn't primarily about greed or growth for its own sake. It's about the structural impossibility of achieving lasting security through limited market share. Having 20% of a market might seem substantial until a competitor with 30% uses their scale advantage to improve products faster or cut prices deeper. The only truly secure position is one where no competitor can threaten your survival.

But achieving dominance triggers countervailing forces. Regulators investigate. Competitors form alliances. New entrants target the incumbent. The pursuit of security through dominance creates the very threats it sought to avoid.

Markets as Structured Insecurity

The leap from international relations to corporate competition might seem vast, but the structural parallels are striking. Markets operate without a final guarantor of survival. Regulations exist, authorities intervene, but no entity ensures your company will exist in five years.

The parallel isn't perfect. Bankruptcy isn't death. Hostile takeovers aren't invasions. But the structural logic rhymes in ways that illuminate both domains.

The security dilemma manifests vividly in technology markets. Google develops AI capabilities to defend against disruption. Microsoft perceives this as threatening its productivity software dominance and responds by partnering with OpenAI. Google sees this partnership as an existential threat requiring massive counter-investment. Each defensive move appears offensive to others.

This dynamic transcends individual sectors. Platform companies expand into adjacent markets seeking defensive integration. Amazon moves into logistics to ensure reliable delivery. FedEx and UPS perceive this as an invasion of their territory. They develop competing capabilities. Amazon interprets their responses as threats to its supply chain control. The spiral continues.

What makes this tragic is that no company initially sought total war. Each moved rationally to protect its position. But the accumulation of rational defensive moves created an environment of total competition that no single actor can now escape.

This framework explains why corporate cooperation remains perpetually fragile despite mutual benefits. Consider industry standard-setting bodies. Companies cooperate to establish technical standards that benefit everyone. Yet each participant seeks to shape standards toward their existing capabilities. The cooperation occurs, but within a competitive framework where relative advantage still matters.

Strategic alliances follow similar patterns. Companies form partnerships for mutual benefit but maintain alternative options. They share APIs but not core algorithms. They collaborate on research but compete on implementation. The cooperation is real but limited by the underlying competitive structure.

Even the most successful collaborations contain seeds of future competition. The Apple-Intel partnership seemed stable for years. Intel provided processors; Apple provided a premium market. Both benefited. Yet Apple couldn't accept permanent dependence on a potential competitor. Intel couldn't ignore the risk that its largest customer might vertically integrate. The partnership dissolved not from failure but from each party's rational response to structural uncertainty.

The deepest tragedy may be how competition erodes the trust necessary for beneficial collaboration. When today's partner might become tomorrow's rival, deep cooperation becomes impossible. Companies must hedge against betrayal even when planning collaboration.

This hedging itself undermines cooperation. When companies maintain alternative options, share limited information, and prepare for partnership dissolution, they create the very dynamics of distrust they fear. The preparation for betrayal makes betrayal more likely.

Silicon Valley's culture of rapid job changes illustrates this dynamic. Companies want to retain talent but know employees will likely leave. So they limit access to strategic information. Employees sense this limitation and feel less loyalty. Their reduced loyalty justifies the company's initial caution. Neither party wants this outcome, but both contribute to it.

Identity as Competitive Weapon

Mearsheimer emphasizes nationalism not as ideology but as the binding force that enables collective action. Without shared identity, states couldn't mobilize populations for competition. The corporate parallel illuminates how culture becomes a competitive necessity, not just an HR initiative.

Strong cultures create competitive advantages by transforming individual employees into collective actors. Apple's design obsession, Amazon's customer focus, Goldman Sachs' elite mystique aren't just organizing principles. They're identity markers that enable extraordinary coordination and effort.

But identity also escalates competition. When rivalry becomes tribal, compromise becomes betrayal. Microsoft versus Apple in the 1990s wasn't just about operating systems. It became a culture war between different visions of computing.

The irony is that companies with the strongest purposes often build the strongest power positions. Purpose creates differentiation. Differentiation enables premium pricing. Premium pricing generates resources. Resources enable expansion. Expansion requires defending accumulated power.

When purpose-driven companies face existential threats, they face an impossible choice. Maintain principles and risk extinction? Or compromise values to ensure survival? The system's logic often overrides founding values, not through moral failure but through structural pressure.

The Limits of Institutional Cooperation

Liberal institutionalists argue that institutions, interdependence, and shared norms can tame anarchy. The World Trade Organization, climate agreements, and industry standards bodies represent attempts to create cooperation despite competition.

Yet institutions reflect power more than they constrain it. The companies that shape standards tend to be those with existing advantages. When powerful actors find institutions constraining, they ignore or reshape them. The US undermined WTO rules when strategically necessary. Companies abandon industry agreements when competitive advantage beckons.

Institutions work when they align with power distributions. They facilitate cooperation among equals or codify dominance by the powerful. But they cannot fundamentally alter the competitive structure that creates the need for cooperation in the first place.

The pandemic starkly illustrated how quickly constructed cooperation collapses under pressure. Decades of supply chain integration fragmented into vaccine nationalism. Trading partners became competitors for scarce resources. The carefully constructed global system revealed its competitive foundation.

Leadership in a Structural Trap

Mearsheimer's framework offers no easy escape from competitive dynamics. But it does provide clarity about the nature of the trap. For leaders, this structural awareness enables more conscious choices even within constraints.

Leaders often assume that changing culture or values will transform competitive dynamics. But if structure drives behavior, then even transformational leadership faces limits. Understanding structural pressure doesn't excuse harmful behavior, but it explains persistent patterns. Uber's competitive aggression continued across multiple CEOs because the market structure created incentives for aggression. Changing leadership without changing structure yields limited results.

This recognition might liberate leaders from impossible expectations. They cannot single-handedly transform competitive dynamics. But they can navigate them more consciously, recognizing when they're responding to structural pressures rather than strategic choice.

If power accumulation triggers balancing responses, then visible restraint might sometimes preserve advantage better than aggressive expansion. Microsoft learned this lesson painfully. Its 1990s aggression triggered antitrust constraints that limited its power for decades. Today's Microsoft practices strategic restraint, maintaining competitor ecosystems despite having the capability to dominate. This isn't altruism but sophisticated strategy. By not fully exercising power, Microsoft avoids triggering the kind of balancing coalition that previously constrained it. Sometimes the most sophisticated power move is choosing not to make it.

Yet restraint has limits. It works when you're already powerful enough that restraint doesn't threaten survival. For companies still establishing position, restraint might mean elimination. The structural logic reasserts itself.

If escape is impossible, what remains?

Consciousness itself has value. Understanding structural pressures enables more deliberate choices. Leaders can recognize when they're responding to systemic forces rather than strategic imperatives. They can distinguish between necessary competition and unnecessary escalation.

Restraint remains possible within limits. Companies can choose not to fully exercise power when restraint doesn't threaten survival. They can avoid triggering unnecessary competitive responses. They can compete without destroying the basis for future cooperation.

Collective action, while difficult, isn't impossible. Industries have occasionally recognized mutual benefit in limiting competition. Standards bodies sometimes genuinely facilitate cooperation. Regulatory frameworks can alter competitive dynamics even if they can't eliminate them.

But these possibilities operate within, not beyond, competitive structure. They represent ways of managing competition, not transcending it.

The Permanent Tragedy

We return to the opening paradox. Cooperative leaders build competitive moats. Purpose-driven companies accumulate market power. Stakeholder capitalists maximize relative advantage.

Through Mearsheimer's lens, this isn't contradiction but structural necessity.

Leaders operate within systems that reward power accumulation regardless of personal values. The CEO who genuinely wants industry collaboration faces investors demanding growth. The executive committed to sustainable practices confronts competitors who might cut corners. The structural logic overrides individual preference.

The most sophisticated leaders recognize this tragedy and work within it. They understand that their cooperative instincts and competitive requirements both reflect rationality under different frames. They pursue authentic leadership while acknowledging structural constraints.

But this recognition carries weight. Knowing you're trapped in competitive dynamics doesn't free you from them. It might even deepen the psychological burden. You compete not from ignorance but from structural necessity.

Mearsheimer's framework leaves us with an uncomfortable question. If competition is structural, if power dynamics are inescapable, if even cooperation occurs within competitive frameworks, then what does ethical leadership mean?

Perhaps it means competing with full awareness of competition's costs. Perhaps it means accumulating power while acknowledging its distortions. Perhaps it means leading with eyes open to both structural constraints and human possibilities within those constraints.

The tragedy of leadership power isn't that it corrupts. It's that even the uncorrupted must participate in its logic. Recognizing this tragedy doesn't eliminate it, but it might be the beginning of whatever wisdom is possible in a competitive world.

That wisdom won't free us from competition. But it might free us from the illusion that competition is choice rather than structure, that power is preference rather than necessity, that leadership can transcend the very system that creates the need for leaders.

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JW

Jason Williamson

Exploring organizational dynamics, leadership, and strategy through systems thinking.